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In this paper we use data from the 1994 and 1996 British Crime
Surveys (BCS) to examine the in‡uence of socio-economic factors on
the reporting of crime. Through probit estimation, we …nd that the
probability of a burglary being reported is signi…cantly reduced if the
individual is currently unemployed or has been engaged in illicit activ-
ity over the past year. We also …nd that, as anticipated, the reporting
likelihood is much increased if the incident involves a positively valued
loss. Using decomposition techniques, we also show that this result is
not driven by di¤erences in mean sample characteristics. Our results
suggest that the di¤erence between the recorded crime rate and the
true crime rate is not constant through the economic cycle. This may
have implications for models of crime and economic activity that make
use of recorded crime …gures..
JEL classi…cation: C21; K42; K49
Keywords: Reported crime; microeconometric model, decomposi-
tion
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11 Introduction
There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the possible relation-
ship between the economic cycle and the reported crime rate. This literature
is comprehensively reviewed in Ehrlich (1996) and Allen (1996). Signi…cant
contributions to the debate on the general crime-economy nexus include Ste-
vans (1988), Field (1990), Pyle and Deadman (1994), Hale (1997), and Os-
born (1995). It comes as no surprise that the debate on crime, which has
been in‡uenced by this work, is fuelled by much controversy. Some of the
con‡ict in the empirical literature is driven by the variety of theoretical foun-
dations underpinning the models estimated. For example, there is consid-
erable debate (typically between economists and criminologists) concerning
the relationship between unemployment and property crime, and the results
given in the literature are far from unequivocal (Young, 1993). This debate
concerns two con‡icting theories about the relationship: opportunity theo-
ries and motivational theories (Cantor and Land, 1985). Those advocating
motivational theories (perhaps the majority view) tend to argue that unem-
ployment or economic hardship, by generating relative poverty, stimulates
criminal activity (see for example Phillips et al., 1972; Sjoquist, 1973; Myers,
1993), The opposing view, driven by opportunity theories, suggests that the
crime rate falls with increasing unemployment . This might be because of
the ‘guardianship e¤ect’: as unemployment increases there are more people
at home to deter criminals (Cohen et al., 1981; Cohen and Felson, 1979), or
it could be because unemployment reduces the wealth of victims (Cohen et
al., 1980).
There are several other areas of controversy in this debate. Not with-
standing the current controversy on econometric technique, one area that
has received attention is the use of o¢cial recorded crime …gures in empirical
models. The frequently cited concern is that o¢cial …gures may be seriously
‡awed due to under-reporting. Given the importance of this issue there is
surprising little attempt to address the problem in the applied literature.
Notable exceptions include Carr-Hill and Stern (1979), and more recently
Pudney et al. (1997, 1998). Pudney et al. attempt to overcome the problem
by developing a simulated maximum likelihood procedure to simultaneously
estimate the crime rate and the reporting rate. However, even this small
literature on the e¤ect of under-reporting dwarfs the applied work that has
considered the factors that in‡uence this behaviour. Although Goldberg
and Nold (1980) include a model of reporting probability in order to deter-
mine whether reporting deters burglars, it is di¢cult to …nd any literature
on in‡uences of crime reporting. This is surprising given the importance of
under-reporting from a public policy perspective. To illustrate this, consider
2the following example. Let us assume that the true crime rate is an increasing
function of unemployment as this hypothesis receives the greatest support
i nt h el i t e r a t u r e( s e eP y l e ,1 9 9 8 ) .W ea r en o ta b l et oo b s e r v et h et r u ec r i m e
rate as o¢cial …gures are based on reported crimes. Rather, we observe mea-
sured crime, which is likely to su¤er from reporting bias. Now, let us suppose
that the micro-foundations of under-reporting suggest a negative relationship
between the reporting rate and unemployment, perhaps a result of social ex-
clusion or marginalisation. If this is the case, then this would imply that
t h ed i ¤ e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h ea c t u a lc r i m er a t ea n dt h em e a s u r e dr a t ei sn o t
constant over the economic cycle. As the unemployment rate increases, the
crime rate increases but the measured rates increases at a slower pace (i.e.
the measured rate of crime will diverge increasingly from the actual rate).
Here we illustrate just one possible consequence of under-reporting, but one
can easily conceive of other micro-foundations that in‡uence this behaviour,
for example, attitudes to the police; the distribution of household insurance
and loss, and cultural di¤erences.
To consider these issues further we explore the foundations of under-
reporting using microeconometric analysis. There are many aspects to con-
sider in this analysis. Intuitively, one might expect that individuals will fail
to report a crime if they perceive the outcome of reporting as negligible. This
might be because of previous experience of the criminal justice system, or
through personal prejudice, but it may be linked to the insurance status of
any items stolen. If the household has no contents insurance then why bother
to report the incident? Similarly, if the individual perceives the response of
the police as likely to be ine¤ectual (as may be the case in high property
crime rate areas), then that individual is less likely to report the incident.
Similarly, are cultural and racial di¤erences likely to a¤ect reporting rates
given the varying perceptions of the police and o¢cialdom across communi-
ties? In order to explore these issues the balance of this paper is as follows.
In the next section we discuss the data set and sample properties. Following
this we present the empirical methodology, outlining the method of probit
estimation and decomposition techniques. In section 4 we present our results
and discussion. The paper is summarised in section 5.
2D a t a a n d s a m p l e
In order to investigate the discrepancy between the measured rate of crime
and the true rate, we can make use of survey data that provides information
about the reporting of crimes. In the UK there are two sources that have been
used to explore the extent of measurement error in reported crime statistics:
3the British Crime Survey (BCS) and the General Household Survey (GHS).
The GHS only considers the reporting of burglary o¤ences and provides little
additional detail about the nature and circumstances of the incidents. The
BCS, however, is a more extensive victim survey that provides victimisation
rates for a large number of categories of o¤ence (the notable exclusions being
fraud, drug o¤ences and theft from businesses). The BCS was …rst admin-
istered in 1982 and has been repeated in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1996.
The initial surveys were administered to around 10,000 households, but the
sample size was increased to 15,000 for the 1994 and 1996 surveys. In addi-
tion, surveys prior to 1994 were conducted using the electoral register as a
sampling frame. From 1994 the method was changed to using the Postcode
Address File, bringing the BCS into line with the main household surveys
and increasing the representativeness of the possible sample. Other changes
in the survey method include the move to Computer-Assisted Personal In-
terviewing in 1994. Given these changes in sampling methodology, interview
technique and sample size, we restrict our analysis to just the pooled 1994
and 1996 sweeps of the BCS. With respect to the sample size, the 1994 survey
yields a core sample of 14,500 adults, and the 1996 survey 16,350 adults. Both
samples are increased by an ethnic minority booster sample of approximately
2000 black and Asian adults. For more details of the sampling procedure for
the 1994 survey see White and Malbon (1995), and for the 1996 survey see
Hales and Stratford (1997).
2.1 Current sample
For our analysis we are only interested in those individuals who have ex-
perienced some form of property crime over the year preceding the survey.
Following Pudney et al. (1997), and in order to be consistent with the liter-
ature on under-reporting and predictive crime models, we focus on incidents
of residential burglary. This major o¤ence is suitable for analysis as we are
less likely to su¤er from recall bias in our estimates (compared to other of-
fences, respondents are very likely to have a good recall of when a burglary
occurred and the circumstances of the crime). Furthermore, with these data
we are unlikely to su¤er problems with evasion bias. Whereas there are well-
documented problems of misreporting in surveys of a sensitive nature (for
example see Jones and Forrest, 1992; Fendrich and Vaughn, 1994), there is
little reason to believe that survey respondents will misreport their experi-
ence of burglary. Although the reduced likelihood of recall or evasion bias
give us some con…dence in the measure of ‘true’ crime and the reporting rates
the BCS provides, the focus on just burglary o¤ences does reduce our sample
size dramatically. However, we are able to include observations on repeat
4burglary incidents as the BCS allows respondents to complete Victim Forms
for up to 3 main incidents (a further 2 incidents are recorded but in much
less detail). For our sample we use a modi…ed version of the BCS de…nition
of burglary: “entering the respondent’s dwelling as a trespasser with the in-
tention of committing theft, rape, grievous bodily harm or unlawful damage
[whether the intention is carried through or not]” (White and Malbon, 1995,
p. 260). In our sample, a burglary occurs if the respondent answers yes to
one of the following questions:
1. Has anyone got into this house/‡at without permission and stolen or
tried to steal anything?
2. Did anyone get into your house/‡at without permission and cause dam-
age?
3. Have you had any evidence that someone has tried to get in without
permission to steal or to cause damage?
We could limit our sample to just those reporting yes to the …rst question,
but question 3 allows us to include attempted burglary in our de…nition,
but given the way the question is posed we must therefore include question
21. Thus our remaining pooled data set, after losses for non-response and
restriction to just burglary incidents, consists of 4168 observations, of which
2149 relate to 1994 and 2019 to 1996.
2.2 Core characteristics
The BCS asks respondents numerous questions about the nature and circum-
stances of each crime they have experienced over the year prior to the survey.
T h e ya r et h e na s k e di ft h ep o l i c ec a m et ok n o wa b o u tt h em a t t e r .T h i sp r o -
vides the basis of our reporting rates. There are, of course, many follow-ups
to this primary question, depending on the interviewee’s initial response. For
example, if the incident was not reported, the respondent is asked to explain
why not, and if the police were informed of the incident, the survey asks
how it was reported and who contacted the police. One di¢culty we have
1Our use of these questions also excludes the part of the BCS de…nition of burglary
that mentions rape or grievous bodily harm. We do this so as to be consistent with the
literature, but partially because of inconsistencies in the way these o¤ences are recorded in
the BCS. For example, if a rape takes place during an incident of burglary, it is classi…ed
as a sexual o¤ence, not a burglary. Furthermore, on inspection of the BCS data, where
we are able to observe incidents that fall outside of the property crime element of the
de…nition, the numbers are negligible.
5is in knowing whether the incident was actually recorded by the police (i.e.
whether or not the incident actually appears in the recorded crime …gures).
We do know if the initial report of the incident was the only contact with the
police concerning the matter, and whether the police caught the o¤ender,
but as we do not know whether a crime number is issued by the police, we
have to con…ne our analysis to reported crime as opposed to recorded crime.
However, for the purpose of our investigation, this de…nition is acceptable as
we are only interested in the micro-foundations of crime reporting.
In our sample of 4168 observations, 2099 (50.36%) incidents were reported
to the police. De…ning an incident that involves loss as one where the respon-
dent places a positive value on any items stolen or damaged, 2668 (64.1%)
of our observations involve a loss. Of those incidents that involve loss, 1590
(59.6%) were reported to the police, compared to a rate of 33.93% for those
incidents that did not involve a loss. In terms of economic prosperity, loss-
involving incidents are fairly evenly distributed between victims who are in
work and those who are currently unemployed. For those incidents involv-
ing a loss, 78.37% of the incidents were experienced by respondents in work,
whereas the …gure is 75.27% for those incidents involving no loss.
3 Methodology
In Goldberg and Nold (1980) the household’s probability of reporting a crime
is modelled as a function of the loss involved, property damage, and the cost
of reporting2. Whether or not a crime is reported, however, will also depend
on a variety of individual attributes, experiences and personal circumstances
speci…c to that incident. For example, an individual’s propensity to report
a crime may vary between age and ethnic groups, may be a¤ected by the
individual’s past experience of burglary, their attitudes to the police, and, of
course, may be a¤ected if some …nancial loss is involved, particularly if an
insurance claim is to made. These likely in‡uences are easily summarised as:
Pr(reporting)=f(incidentinvolvesloss; socioeconomicfactors;
incidentspecific factors; attitudestothepolice) (1)
This function can then be estimated empirically to determine the factors
that are signi…cantly associated with the reporting of an incident.
2Like the BCS, their data set does not provide adequate information to include a cost
of reporting variable in the empirical model but the authors do include some very simple
socioeconomic variables.
63.1 Estimation technique
We do not directly observe an individual’s tendency to report a crime. Rather,
we observe the reporting outcome for each speci…c incident, which is a bi-
nary outcome: either reported or not. This suggests that we can estimate
our model through either a logistic or probit mechanism. As such, we begin
our model by de…ning a latent variable r¤
i that represents an individual’s
propensity to report a crime. This drives the observed binary indicator of
whether a crime was reported, ri, through the usual probit mechanism:
r
¤
i = li® + xi¯ + "i (2)
ri = »(r
¤
i > 0) (3)
where »(:) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the individual reports a given
crime and 0 otherwise, xi is a row vector of personal and demographic at-
tributes, ¯ is the corresponding vector of parameters, and "i is a disturbance
term, normally distributed with mean zero and variance one, conditional on
x.T h e t e r mli is a binary variable capturing whether the incident involves
a loss. We include this as a separate term to highlight that …nancial loss
is likely to be a particularly signi…cant explanatory variable for reporting
through its relationship with insurance. Estimation of (2) through a pro-
bit regression is straightforward, and provides us with direct measures of the
impact of the various micro-factors on the likelihood of reporting an incident.
3.2 Decomposition
Given that we suspect that incidents involving some form of loss are more
likely to be reported, a worthwhile line of inquiry is to explore whether those
incidents involving a loss would be reported in the absence of that loss. In
other words, we need to determine whether it is the loss itself that drives the
reporting di¤erential, or whether the di¤erential is due to di¤erences in un-
derlying characteristics between those people who experience loss and those
who do not (i.e. are those people who report losses are signi…cantly di¤er-
ent in terms of their characteristics than those who report incidents without
loss?). To do this we can use an Oaxaca-type decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973),
a technique widely used in the labour economics literature to explore wage
di¤erentials. This is achieved by splitting our sample into those incidents
involving a loss and those which do not. We then re-estimate equation (2)




i = xi¯ + "i (4)
where ri, ¯, xi,a n d"i are speci…ed as above. Following Gomulka and Stern
(1990), the separate estimates of (4) are used to determine the predicted
di¤erential in reporting rates via two alternative decompositions3:
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where ¯ is the estimate of the coe¢cients from the probit equation (4), vary-
ing according to which group is used (superscript L for incidents involving
loss, superscript N for those with no loss). The terms ^ rL and ^ rN are the
respective average of the predicted reporting probabilities for incidents with
loss and incidents without. The expression ¹ P(^ ¯
L
;XL) is the average across
the sample of the predicted probabilities using the estimated coe¢cients for
the sample of incidents with loss and the corresponding mean characteristics,
and the other expressions vary according to whether coe¢cients and charac-
teristics are used for incidents with or without loss. Thus in equation (5), the
left hand square-bracketed expression provides an estimate of the di¤erence
in predicted reporting probability due to di¤erences in regression coe¢cients,
and the second term gives the di¤erence attributable to di¤erences in the un-
derlying characteristics of the sample. The expressions in equation (6) yield
the same estimates but with the non-loss involving incidents as the base
group.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Probit estimates
Our probit estimates of the probability of reporting a burglary incident are
given in Table 1. We provide estimates for the whole sample alongside sep-
arate estimates for incidents involving a loss and those which do not. The
3We specify two decomposition equations due to uncertainty in indexing our base group.
Ordinarily we might be certain that one group is the base (i.e. if we were considering the
impact of a new treatment then our base case would be those who had not had the
treatment), but we are not 100% certain as to whether incidents involving a loss are our
base. Whether or not this presents a problem becomes evident if the two equations provide
radically di¤erent estimates of the predicted reporting di¤erential.
8model is speci…ed simply with the set of covariates discussed above. We do
not include an insurance variable due to the way questions are asked in the
BCS (respondents are only asked about insurance coverage if they experience
loss or damage that is valued positively - we deal with this later). For a de-
scription of all the covariates reported here, and their descriptive statistics,
see Table A1 in the Appendix. The base characteristics for the regressions
are: white, married male, unskilled occupation with no formal quali…cations,
currently resident in the West Midlands, with no reported drug use. Rather
than presenting the estimated coe¢cients we give the marginal e¤ects (dF/dx
in Table 2), although the coe¢cients are used later for the decompositions.
We do this because probit (or logit) estimated coe¢cients cannot be inter-
preted directly as the impact on the dependent variable of a one unit change
in the independent variable, particularly when the explanatory variables are
predominately 0-1 dummies4.
4E¤ectively the marginal e¤ects show by how much the predicted probability of report-
ing an incident changes (at the means of all other variables) when the dummy variable in
question becomes true (i.e. equals 1). In order to do this for a probit, one has to deter-
mine Pr(ri 6=0 jxi)=© ( xi¯) when the dummy variable = 0 and for when it equals 1, and
calculate the di¤erence in this predicted probability (where © is the standard cumulative
normal distribution, and xi¯ is the probit index).
9Table 1.
The probability of reporting a burglary: probit estimates5
Full Sample No loss Loss
Covariate dF/dx jtj dF/dx jtj dF/dx jtj
AGE/10 -.004 1.060 -.005 .430 -.005 1.150
MAR0MALE -.017 .760 -.003 .090 -.024 .860
MAR0FMAL .006 .260 .001 .040 .009 .350
MAR1FMAL .061*** 2.750 .054 1.480 .059** 2.230
BLACK .054* 1.780 .069 1.410 .049 1.320
ASIAN .019 .660 .057 1.130 .002 .060
OTHER -.055 1.180 .002 .030 -.077 1.380
UNEMPL -.094** 2.380 -.059 1.020 -.112** 2.250
SOC1 -.056 1.400 -.050 .840 -.059 1.190
SOC2 -.030 .770 .017 .290 -.056 1.170
SOC3 -.067 1.580 -.066 1.040 -.060 1.140
EDU1 -.005 .170 -.029 .650 .013 .390
EDU26 -.038** 1.910 -.042 1.290 -.033 1.390
ANYYEAR -.096*** 4.040 -.085** 2.400 -.102*** 3.380
MEMBNWS .054** 1.940 .082* 1.810 .041 1.250
BADPOLIC -.014 .670 -.001 .020 -.022 .850
PREVINCD -.018** 2.090 .026** 2.370 -.075*** 6.040
PCNAME -.005 .240 .007 .240 -.013 .520
LOSS .249*** 15.050 -- --
WEEKEND .033** 1.930 .027 1.030 .051*** 2.480
NIGHTIME .041*** 2.540 .063** 2.450 .047** 2.380
NORTH .094*** 2.450 .097 1.520 .093** 2.060
YORKS .061* 1.780 .041 .710 .068* 1.730
NWEST -.016 .480 -.018 .340 -.010 .240
EASTM .062 1.540 .027 .410 .083* 1.760
EASTA -.032 .540 -.045 .520 -.017 .240
SEAST .044 1.270 .071 1.200 .031 .740
SWEST .058 1.300 .163** 2.100 .006 .120
WALES .023 .450 .056 .700 .010 .160
LOND .048 1.510 .047 .870 .046 1.250
observations 4168 1500 2668
Â2 (d.f.) 356.58 (31) 48.84 (30) 107.53 (30)
Log Likelihood -2710.64 -936.47 -1746.12
Note: *** = signi…cant at 1% level, ** = signi…cant at 5% level,
* = signi…cant at 10% level
5The estimates include a survey year dummy that is not reported here.
10The results given in Table 1 suggest that there is some variation in the
probability of reporting across various socioeconomic groups. Compared to
the base, married females are signi…cantly more likely to report an incident,
unless it involves no loss. Individuals who are currently unemployed are
less likely to report incidents compared to the base (making the probability
of reporting lower by 10%), as are those with non-degree quali…cations (but
neither are signi…cant if the incident involves no loss). An interesting result is
the e¤ect of self-reported drug use. We included a variable to capture whether
the individual had reported any drug use in the past year (ANYYEAR) as
it is quite conceivable that such individuals are less likely to want to have
contact with the police. Our results support this hypothesis, with the drug
use variable being negative and highly signi…cant across all samples.
The impact of the variables capturing the individual’ previous contact
with police and experience of burglary are quite predictable, although there
appears to be no link between reporting and dissatisfaction with the police.
This result holds however we de…ne this relationship with the police, even
if the relationship is positive (i.e. if the respondent knows or is related to
someone in the police). Other in‡uential factors include being part of a
neighbourhood watch scheme, which has a positive in‡uence on the proba-
bility of reporting (although it is not signi…cant for the sample of incidents
involving loss). Interestingly, if the incident is not the …rst in the past year
(variable PREVINCD) then this has a signi…cant negative in‡uence on the
likelihood of the incident being reported, (unless the current incident involves
no loss, in which case it is more likely to be reported). This result is di¢cult
to explain. The PREVINCD variable may be capturing some of the e¤ects
of previous exposure to the police, or could simply re‡ect an individual’s
change in attitude to burglary if the incident occurs more than once in the
year.
The …nal group of in‡uences are incident speci…c. Not surprisingly, if
the incident involves a loss then this has a highly signi…cant (absolute t
value = 15.05) impact on the probability of the incident being reported6.
The results suggest that if the incident involves a loss the this adds 0.249
(i.e.25%) to the probability of the incident being reported. In addition,
where incidents occur at the weekend or at night, this signi…cantly in‡uences
the likelihood of reporting (although weekend is not signi…cant for incidents
involving no loss). We also observe some regional a¤ects, with the likelihood
6Following Goldberg and Nold (1980), a second model was estimated that included a
number of dummy variables representing incremental bands of loss (i.e. 0-£49, £50-£99,
£100-£199, etc.). These results, available on request, are very similar to those presented
in Table 2. The main di¤erence is that all the loss dummies are positive and signi…cant,
but their coe¢cients increase with the size of the loss.
11of the incident being reported increasing if it occurs in the North of England
or in Yorks/Humberside, compared to the base region (West Midlands).
4.1.1 Decompositions
Concentrating on our reporting di¤erentials, the results of our decomposi-
tions are presented in Table 2. The …rst …gure in Table 2 shows the di¤er-
ence in reporting probability between incidents involving a loss and those
which do not. The …gures following this are the proportions of this di¤erence
explained by di¤erences in coe¢cients and characteristics respectively.
Table 2.
Claimers/non-claimers reporting probit decompositions
Di¤erence in means
^ rL ¡ ^ rN 0.264
Di¤erence in coe¢cients
f ¹ P(^ ¯
L
;XL) ¡ P(^ ¯
N
;XL)g 0.250 (94.9%)
f ¹ P(^ ¯
L




f ¹ P(^ ¯
N
;XL) ¡ P(^ ¯
N
;XN)g 0.014 (5.1%)
f ¹ P(^ ¯
L
;XL) ¡ P(^ ¯
L
;XN)g 0.017 (6.4%)
The …rst observation about the …gures in Table 3 is that there is a 26.4%
di¤erence in reporting probability when an incident involves a loss, all other
things being equal (and regardless of which group we use as the base). Thus,
calculating the probability of an incident being reported at the means of all
variables, there is a 33.5% chance of an incident being reported if it involves
no loss, but a 59.9% chance if it does involve loss. In terms of what drives
this reporting di¤erential, Table 3 provides us with two alternative measures
according to which we consider the base group. If we consider incidents
involving no loss as the base, 94.9% of the reporting di¤erential is caused by
di¤erences in estimated coe¢cients, with the remaining 5.1% di¤erence being
due to di¤erences in mean characteristics. The components of the reporting
di¤erential are similar when incidents involving loss are considered the base
(93.6% and 6.4% respectively). These results tell us that around 95% of the
reporting di¤erential can be primarily attributable to the impact of loss. The
(much smaller) remainder of the di¤erential is therefore due to the di¤erences
in mean characteristics between the two sub-samples.
The decomposition results are important, particularly if the link between
loss and reporting is related to insurance purchase and economic prosperity.
12To illustrate this we split our full sample into two groups. Group 1 consisted
of those in either managerial/professional or skilled professions (59.9%) and
group 2 consisted of those in partly or unskilled occupations and those who
were currently unemployed (40.1%). The distribution of incidents involving
loss was evenly spread between group 1 and group 2. For group 1, 65.4%
experienced incidents involving loss, whereas the rate for group 2 was 62.0%.
If we consider just the incidents involving loss, we expect the reporting rate
to be very similar for both groups given the results presented above (we have
observed that reporting di¤erentials are not much a¤ected by di¤erences in
characteristics). Indeed, the reporting rate for group 1 where the incidents
involve loss is 61.6%, with the rate for group 2 only slightly lower at 57.5%.
What is illuminating, however, is the large di¤erence in insurance coverage
between the two groups. For the …rst group, who are economically more
prosperous, 61.6% of the incidents involving loss are covered by insurance,
whereas for group 2, the rate is much reduced at 37.9%. This …nding is
consistent with other surveys and is particularly worrying. As we are certain
that those on lower income are much less likely to insure their contents (e.g.
Lewis, 1989), then as crime rates increases as the economy slows down, the
redistributive e¤ect of insurance is increased.
5 Concluding remarks
One of the purposes of this paper has been to add more fuel to the con-
troversial debate on the whole crime/economy nexus. We present the …rst
attempt to model the under-reporting of crime using UK data. To do this
we use the British Crime Survey, which yields a rich environment in which to
test the micro-foundations of the propensity to report crime. We began our
analysis by hypothesising that the reporting of crime, particularly burglary,
is likely to be related to a number of socioeconomic factors, once we con-
trol for individual attributes and incident speci…c factors. Using maximum
likelihood estimation techniques, we have found that the probability of an
incident being reported is signi…cantly decreased if the victim is currently
unemployed. This supports our suggestion that the di¤erence between the
true rate of crime and the measured rate of crime varies as economic activity
varies.
Linked to the economic cycle is the relationship between loss, insurance
and the probability of reporting a crime. We have found that incidents in-
volving a positively valued loss are fairly evenly distributed between those
in work and respondents who are currently unemployed. This implies that
as the crime rate increases, the increase in burglaries involving loss will be
13more or less spread evenly across the two groups. However, the distribu-
tion of insurance coverage is not evenly distributed between the groups, with
those on higher incomes having a much higher tendency to insure household
contents. What is more, we have shown that incidents involving loss have a
much higher probability of being reported than incidents that do not involve
loss. This generates two causes of concern. We know that the level of insur-
ance coverage increases with income (Lewis, 1989), thus, during a downturn
in the economic cycle we anticipate insurance coverage to decrease as rela-
tive prosperity worsens. This implies that individuals who are a¤ected by
economic downturn su¤er considerably, as the incidence of burglary will in-
crease but less of the incidents are covered by insurance. Our second concern
is that this relationship will have a further impact on the disparity between
measured crime and actual crime that was illustrated above.
Finally, we highlight a particularly interesting result concerning criminal
activity and reporting. We found that there is a signi…cant negative asso-
ciation between involvement in drug use and reporting of crimes. Clearly
individuals who have some illegal behaviour to hide from the authorities are
much less likely to report incidents to police. This raises another question
mark over the relationship between measured crime and actual crime, par-
ticularly during periods of economic downturn when illegal activity is likely
to increase.
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16Appendix - Table A1: Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Personal characteristics
AGE/10 Respondent’s age/10 3.751 2.434
MAR0MALE 1 = single male 0.227 0.419
MAR1MALE 1 = married male 0.320 0.466
MAR0FMAL 1 = single female 0.229 0.420
MAR1FMAL 1 = married female 0.225 0.417
WHITE 1 = white 0.784 0.412
BLACK 1 = Black (African, Caribbean, other) 0.090 0.287
ASIAN 1 = Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) 0.094 0.292
OTHER 1 = Chinese, other ethnic origin, or none 0.031 0.174
UNEMPL 1 = currently unemployed 0.227 0.419
SOC1 1 = managerial/professional occupation 0.292 0.455
SOC2 1 = skilled occupation 0.306 0.461
SOC3 1 = partly skilled occupation 0.124 0.329
SOC4 1 = unskilled occupation 0.037 0.189
EDU1 1 = degree or higher quali…cation 0.173 0.378
EDU26 1 = non-degree quali…cation 0.570 0.495
EDU7 1 = no formal quali…cations 0.257 0.437
ANYYEAR 1 = has taken any drug in past year 0.150 0.358
Attitudes and exposure to police
MEMBNWS 1 = part of neighbourhood watch scheme 0.098 0.297
PREVINCD number of previous incidents in past year 0.801 0.954
BADPOLIC 1 = previously dissatis…ed with police 0.191 0.393
PCNAME 1 = know someone in police 0.224 0.417
Incident speci…c attributes
LOSS 1 = incident involves loss 0.640 0.480
WEEKEND 1 = incident occurred at weekend 0.650 0.477
NIGHTIME 1 = incident occurred at night 0.518 0.500
NORTH 1 = resident in North of England 0.081 0.273
YORKS 1 = resident in Yorks/Humberside 0.132 0.338
NWEST 1 = resident in North West England 0.162 0.369
EASTM 1 = resident in East Midlands 0.069 0.254
WESTM 1 = resident in West Midlands 0.094 0.292
EASTA 1 = resident in East Anglia 0.024 0.153
SEAST 1 = resident in South East England 0.124 0.330
SWEST 1 = resident in South West England 0.050 0.217
WALES 1 = resident in Wales 0.036 0.186
LOND 1 = resident in London 0.228 0.419
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